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This paper analyzes the e⁄ect of federal and state maternity leave policies on female employ-
ment. We analyze if the enactment of the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) di⁄eren-
tially a⁄ected states that previously implemented maternity leave laws than those states which
did not. Additionally, we study whether FMLA caused an increase in the female employment
and labor force participation in those states that expanded its bene￿ts and relaxed the eligibility
criteria. Finally, we analyze the Paid Family Leave program in California, comparing how the
change in female employment and labor force participation di⁄ers from those states which have
FMLA alone and those which have complemented the bene￿ts of FMLA. Using March CPS
data available from the Integrated Public Use Micro data Series (IPUMS), our results suggest,
￿rst, a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of FMLA on female employment and, second, a positive
and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the change in female employment for some of the states that expanded
the bene￿ts and eligibility criteria of FMLA
Keywords: Family Medical Leave Act, Temporary Disability Insurance, Female Employ-
ment.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, parental leave policies have been an important issue of debate given their
potential impacts on employment, leave taking and earnings. Considering that 78 percent of labor
force is composed of families where both parents work (Grant et. al, 2005), parental leave policy
is a relevant topic both at the federal and state level of the government. Research on the e⁄ect
of such leave policies are particularly important given the recent trends in female employment.
For instance, more than half of women with children under the age of one were employed in 1998
compared to only two-￿fths ten years earlier (Waldfogel, 1999a).
In spite of the substantial increase in the percentage of women with young children in the
labor force, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) enacted in 1993 is the only law in the
United States at the federal level to directly address family leave issues. Hence after, some states1
have introduced di⁄erent extensions to the FMLA which relax the employee￿ s eligibility -such as
the minimum number of hours worked and the required number of workers in the ￿rm- covering
both public and private sector employees. Although FMLA is the only law at the federal level
which provides some assistance to new parents, there were laws prevalent at the state level long
before the federal act came into e⁄ect. In particular, the Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI)
provides wage replacement for non-work connected sickness or injury, includes disabilities related
with pregnancies. The TDI is implemented by ￿ve states2 in di⁄erent years (from 1942 to 1969).
The Paid Family Leave program, implemented by California in 2004 is one of the most recent law
enacted with regard to parental leave policy.
The above policies basically di⁄er in either their medical requirements for eligibility or the
paid/unpaid leave they provide. On the one hand, TDI provides paid leave, but only if the mother￿ s
maternity is associated with medical conditions supported by a doctor￿ s note3. On the other hand,
1Connecticut, Maine, Oregon and Vermont are the states whose FMLA expansion covers both the public as well
as private sector employees. There are seven other states plus District of Columbia which also expanded FMLA but
does not cover both public and private sector employees.
2California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island. Puerto Rico also has TDI law.
3After the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, every pregnancy is treated as a temporary disability.
2FMLA provides unpaid leave but it does not require the consideration of maternity as a temporary
disability. Finally, California￿ s Paid Family Leave program can be considered as the most generous
of these programs since it provides a paid leave (as TDI) and, in addition, it does not require the
temporary disability consideration (as FMLA).
This paper analyzes the impact of the existing parental leave policies on female employment.
In particular, do these di⁄erent policies have the same impact on female employment? We examine
whether the introduction of FMLA di⁄erently a⁄ected female employment in those states with
paid parental leave policy before FMLA was enacted ￿ those which previously implemented the
TDI￿and those states which did not have any parental leave policy ￿ those which neither passed
TDI nor any other form of state maternity leave policy4. Additionally, we examine if change in
the female employment was higher in those states which expanded the bene￿ts (and relaxed the
eligibility criteria) of FMLA than in those which did not. Finally, we analyze whether California￿ s
Paid Family Leave program has a di⁄erential impact on female employment compared to (1) states
that did not expand FMLA, and (2) states which expanded FMLA. The answer to these questions
provides some interesting policy recommendations about parental leave programs.
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of FMLA on female employment, coverage, leave-
taking and earnings. One of the most relevant works in this respect is Waldfogel (1999a). She uses
March CPS data for the years 1992-1995 to compare the change in female employment, coverage,
earnings and leave-taking between states with no job-protected maternity leave legislations before
FMLA (39 states) to the 11 states and DC with prior job-protected parental leave laws. However,
in this study some of the states clasi¢ ed as states without maternity leave legislations before FMLA
(among the 39 states) had some form of maternity leave policy prevalent before FMLA. Using a
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimation strategy Waldfogel￿ s results indicate that there is
an increase in coverage and leave-taking following the enforcement of FMLA, whereas there is no
change in employment. Given that eligible women in some of the experimental states actually
received treatment, this could potentially biased the estimates towards zero.
The di⁄erence between our work and the former paper is twofold. First, we identify those
4There are eighteen states which had no maternity leave policy before the implementation of FMLA. They are,
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.
3￿ve states that had some form of paid parental leave policy before FMLA was enacted, i.e. those
states which previously implemented TDI. This speci￿c classi￿cation allows us to work with a
homogeneous group of states which have been a⁄ected by the same law, and it captures the uniform
di⁄erential impact of FMLA on female employment between those states applying TDI and those
applying no state parental leave policies5. Second, we compare whether the impact of FMLA
on female employment di⁄ers between those states which expanded its bene￿ts and relaxed its
eligibility criteria and those which did not expand them. This enables us to study whether the
impact on female employment and labor force participation is di⁄erent when certain states make
the parental leave policy more generous. In contrast to the previous results, we ￿nd a positive
and statistically signi￿cant impact of FMLA on female employment in the states which had no law
prior to FMLA compared to the states which had TDI6.
Another important contribution to the literature is Kallaman (1998). She studies the e⁄ect of
the FMLA on female employment and wages. Her results show a positive (negative) and signi￿cant
e⁄ect of FMLA on employment (wages). Kallaman￿ s work does not make any distinction between
the e⁄ects of FMLA and other existing policies. On the contrary, our paper focuses on comparing
the relative performance of the federal and state policies on female employment and labor force
participation which greatly enriches the analysis. Baum (2003a) also studies the impact of family
leave legislation on female employment but ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect. Baum (2003b)
￿nds that family leave legislations allows mothers to delay their return to their prechildbirth jobs
but only by a couple of weeks. Using employee responses to the 2000 Survey of employees, Waldfogel
(2001) ￿nd that over half of leave-takers report being concerned about ￿nancial constraints while
on leave. More recently, Ho⁄erth and Curtin (2006) studied how implementation of the FMLA
a⁄ected mothers￿return to the work place and their changes in wages. However, as mentioned
before, our paper is mainly focused on the e⁄ect of maternity leave policies on female employment
across di⁄erent states.
We use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences (DD) and di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DDD) estima-
5Note that California, New Jersey and Rhode Island had some maternity leave legislations before FMLA was
enacted, so the di⁄erential e⁄ect on female employment cannot be attributed to TDI alone for these three states.
6Using the same states as the experimental and non-experimental groups considered by Waldfogel, we replicate
her results, i.e.:obtain no statistically signi￿cant impact of FMLA on female employment.
4tion strategy, where the ￿rst di⁄erence is between the states which received the treatment (states
that had TDI) and the states which did not. The second source of di⁄erence relates to the time of
the treatment, i.e.: before and after 1993, when FMLA was passed. The third di⁄erence is between
the treated group and the control group, which did not receive the treatment. Some of the results
indicate that, ￿rst, the impact of FMLA on female employment in those states without TDI is
signi￿cantly more positive than the impact of this law in those states which already had TDI. The
increase in female employment and labor force participation in those states that most generously
expanded the bene￿ts and eligibility criteria of FMLA is signi￿cantly higher than in those that
did not. Finally, the introduction of California￿ s Paid Family Leave program in 2004 has not yet
provoked changes in female employment which can be considered signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those
states applying either the FMLA or the expanded FMLA alone.
As mentioned above, the e⁄ects of FMLA on employment have been shown to be positive (but
small) by both theoretical and empirical literature; see Klerman and Leibowitz (1997), Ruhm (1997)
and Waldfogel (1999a). This paper, then, goes in the line of this literature, but provides a much
richer analysis and comparison about the e⁄ects of FMLA on female employment in states with
and without TDI, examines the labor market e⁄ects of the FMLA expansions, and ￿nally provides
a comparison about the impact of the most recent and generous parental leave policy in California
with respect to those policies currently applied in the rest of the country.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop an overview of the parental
leave laws in United States. Section 3 explains the theoretical e⁄ects of mandated leave policies
on female employment. Section 4 lays out the research design and methodology. In section 5, we
present our results and provide some intuition. Section 6 concludes and suggests further research
in the analysis of parental leave policies at the federal and state level.
2 Overview of parental leave laws
Parental leave policy has undergone many changes during the last decades. Figure 1 illustrates
the evolution of maternity leave laws in US. The ￿rst state to introduce a paid maternity leave
through TDI was Rhode Island in 1942, followed by California (1946), New Jersey (1948), New
5York (1949) and Hawaii (1969). The program provides temporary income to workers with non-work
related short-term disabilities, including pregnancy and childbirth. It is funded by either employee
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In particular, TDI can be understood as a form of paid maternity leave, since disability insurance
policies provide paid leave at state level and bene￿ts for disability related to pregnancy and child-
birth to ensure the same treatment as other medical disabilities. The TDI coverage for the ￿rst
few weeks after a birth is routine, since all mothers are considered medically disabled for a certain
period of time after child-birth. A study by the University of Rhode Island (2005) suggests that
about 62 percent of TDI claimants were women, and the most explanatory variable to account for
such high number of women ￿ling claims was TDI coverage for childbirth (Employment Bulletin,
RI Department of Labor and Training).
The Family and Medical Leave Act (enacted in 1993) is the only law in terms of parental leave
policy at the federal level. The legislation covers private, state and local government employees.
However, the coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act is not universal. FMLA guarantees
parents unpaid, job-protected leave of up to 12 weeks following the birth or adoption of a child,
but only if they meet certain qualifying conditions. First, they must work for a ￿rm with 50 or
more employees, which means only about 60 percent of workers in the private-sector are covered
(Han and Waldfogel, 2003). Second, they must have worked at least 1,250 hours in the past year
for their employers, which reduces the share of workers covered to 46 percent (Cantor et al, 2001).
Over the years a considerable number of states have relaxed as well as complemented the re-
quirements of FMLA. This paper considers four states for whose FMLA expansion not only a⁄ected
public but also private sector workers8and have made the FMLA more generous. In particular, the
7See table 3 in the appendix for a detailed explanation about weekly bene￿t amounts and duration of the TDI
program.
8There are eight other states which expanded the FMLA bene￿ts, but they did not cover both public and private
6state of Connecticut expanded FMLA in 1997 applying it to employees who worked 1000 hours for
at least 12 months prior to a request for a leave, and eligible employees are entitled 16 workweeks
of leave (instead of only 12). In 1997, Maine extended the applicability of its family medical leave
laws by lowering the requirements for employee eligibility to 15 employees. Oregon (1996) made
FMLA more generous by applying it to employers with 25 or more employees, and established that
those workers who are employed for 180 days or more are eligible for 12 weeks of leave within a
12 month period. Finally, similar to Oregon, Vermont (1998) reduced the number of minimum
employees to 10, who should have worked for one year on an average of 30 hours a week to be
eligible for 12 weeks of leave during any 12 month period. In addition, all of these four states allow
substituting accrued paid leave for maternity leave purposes (see table 4 of appendix for details
about the extensions of FMLA).
Finally, one of the most recent parental leave policy to be enacted is California￿ s Paid Family
Leave (PFL) program, which came into e⁄ect in July 20049. California is the ￿rst state in the
country to create a comprehensive paid family leave program. It provides workers with paid leave
during a period of six weeks, covering approximately 55 percent of their pre-taxed weekly wage, up
to a maximum of $840, while on leave. This insurance program is fully funded by the employees.
The new mothers in California are now eligible for Paid Family Leave bene￿ts in addition to the
TDI bene￿ts. While FMLA o⁄ers 12 weeks of unpaid leave for those working for employers with
50 or more employees, Paid Family Leave program guarantees that 6 of those weeks are paid.
3 Theory
The theory on mandated bene￿ts suggest that they preserve the employers￿ability to tailor arrange-
ments to their workers and to o⁄er more than minimum packages. In terms of their allocational
e⁄ects on employment, mandated bene￿ts represent a tax at a rate equal to the di⁄erence between
the employers cost of providing the bene￿t and the employee￿ s valuation of it (Summers, 1989). In
other words, it assumes that workers and ￿rms voluntarily agree to the provision of family leave
sector employees. In addition, the relaxations in eligibility and expansions in bene￿ts were minimal.
9More recently, two other states adopted the Paid Family Leave program. Washington passed the Paid Family
Leave law in 2007 and New Jersey￿ s Paid Family Leave law took e⁄ect in July 2009. In this paper, we study the
impact of only California￿ s Paid Family Leave program which was amongst the ￿rst state to adopt it.
7if the expected bene￿ts exceed the associated costs. Parental leave bene￿ts could also increase
occupational segregation, by increasing the relative cost of employing women in certain types of
jobs, and leading to higher unemployment for the groups who are most likely to use it. (Ruhm and
Teague, 1997). However, there are a considerable number of economic arguments favoring leave
entitlements which usually focus on retaining ￿rm-speci￿c human capital or decreasing unemploy-
ment by reducing the need for women to change jobs, if they wish to spend time at home with
young children. (Trzcinski, 1991).
According to the theory (Ruhm, 1997), a mandated leave raises labor costs and shifts the labor
demand curve to the left (from D1 to D2 in Figure 2). Since employees receive bene￿t from the
leave entitlement, the supply curve simultaneously shifts to the right (from S1 to S2). Hence the
equilibrium wages fall while employment may either increase or decrease, depending on the relative
size of the shifts. Figure 2 illustrates the case where the expenses to employers exceed the bene￿ts
to the employees, and employment decreases (from E1 to E2). However, there could be additional
dynamic e⁄ects. For instance, labor productivity would rise if parental leave increases ￿rm-speci￿c
human capital by allowing individuals to return to their old jobs. This causes the demand curve
to shift to the right (from D2 to D3 in Figure 2), increasing employment and decreasing the wage
reduction or actually leading to a rise in earnings. The supporters of leave mandates frequently use
this reasoning to anticipate increases in both wages and employment for the groups who are most











8The theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction regarding the e⁄ects of parental leave
programs on employment. On one hand, it predicts that the cost associated with the leave might
be borne by women as a group, in the form of lower employment (as employers might shift away
from hiring women), or in the form of lower wages (when employers pass on the cost of bene￿ts to
women). On the other hand, it also predicts that these e⁄ects might be o⁄set by an increase in the
labor force attachment of individual women.
4 Research design
4.1 Identi￿cation Strategy
The research design is based on the study developed by Waldfogel (1999a). In the ￿rst part of our
analysis, the eighteen states which did not have parental leave policy prior to FMLA ￿ those states
neither applying TDI nor any other form of state parental leave policy￿constitute the experimental
states. The ￿ve states which did have TDI prior to FMLA are the non-experimental states. For the
second part of the study, the four states which expanded or complemented FMLA are considered as
the experimental states for each particular case, with the non-experimental states being the states
applying only FMLA. Finally, the state of California (experimental state) is compared with those
states which only have FMLA or have expanded it (non-experimental states). We could use DD
analysis to compare the change in outcomes for the experimental states to the change in outcome
for the non-experimental states. However, this approach may produce biased estimate if there were
other di⁄erences between these two groups of states that a⁄ected both the passage of state laws and
the change in their outcome variables over time (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). To overcome
this problem, we use a DDD methodology.
We study the impact of state parental leave policies on the employment of women. Since we use
a DDD estimation strategy, this requires identifying one or more treatment groups (the groups who
are a⁄ected by the passage of a law) and one or more control groups (those who are not a⁄ected
by the law but are otherwise a⁄ected by the same underlying factors, so that their behavior can
be used to approximate how the treatment group would have acted in the absence of the policy).
The di⁄erent parental leave policies that we analyze are expected to primarily bene￿t women of
9childbearing ages, therefore, we use women aged 19 to 45 with children older than one year old, or
women in the same age group who are childless as our treatment group. In addition, we consider
an alternative treatment group in our analysis, which is composed of women aged 19 to 45 with
children under the age of one. These groups of women are included in the treatment group because
they are eligible and more likely to obtain the bene￿ts of parental leave policies. Also, we focus on
these women because they are the potential bene￿ciaries and might bear some of the costs of the
law.
In order to isolate the impact of the parental leave policies from other factors (like economic
shocks or other policy changes) that a⁄ect labor market outcomes, we use control groups. Ideally, a
control group should be similar in characteristics to the treatment group, and hence likely to respond
in the same way to a given policy change, except for the fact that it does not receive the treatment.
For this purpose, we use women aged 46 to 60 as the control group, since they are the plausibly
substitute for women under 45 in employment but are more likely to have reached the end of their
reproductive lives and hence less likely to bene￿t from parental leave laws. However, comparison
between younger females and older females might not be su¢ cient to identify the e⁄ect of parental
leave policies. Older women usually have their own labor market trends which di⁄er from that of
younger women, and there could be some age-speci￿c factors that might make their preferences
towards work di⁄erent from that of younger females. For this purpose (and as is customary in the
literature)10, we use men between the age of 19 and 45 as an alternative control group. Men of the
same age as women in the treatment group, while also potential substitutes in employment, are
less likely to have been a⁄ected by changes in tastes for work as older women. However, men have
their own work preferences and might face di⁄erent labor market prospects compared to women
(mainly due to gender discrimination in the workplace). Since each of the control groups we use
are plausible but imperfect comparisons for the treatment group, we use both types of workers
alternatively as control groups in order to better identify the e⁄ects of parental leave policies on
female employment11.
Our estimates of the e⁄ects of the federal parental leave policy on female employment is the
10See Baker and Milligan (2008), Rodgers and Zveglich (2003)
11Similar to Waldfogel (1999a) we consider these two control groups, in order to develop meaningful comparison.
10di⁄erence between the change in female employment after the introduction of the FMLA in those
states which previously applied TDI and those which did not. Another estimate of this e⁄ect is
obtained from the di⁄erence in the change of the female employment between those states which
expanded FMLA and those which did not. Finally, the estimate of the e⁄ect of the state parental
leave policies on female employment measures the di⁄erence between the change in the female
employment in California ￿ after the enactment of the Paid Family Leave program￿and that in the
states which expanded FMLA and those which did not.
4.2 Data
We use IPUMS-CPS data from 1979-2007, which is an integrated set of data from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS). In the second part of our study, which analyzes the e⁄ects of
the FMLA expansions, we also use data from CPS where time period depends on the particular
year in which the state expanded FMLA. Finally, the analysis of California uses data from the
2001-2007 CPS.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the period 1979-2007 (mean and standard error)
of the characteristics of the treatment and control groups. Column 1 shows the characteristics of
women in their childbearing age with their youngest child above the age of one or women without
children. Column 2 contains women between 19-45 whose youngest child is less than one year.
Column 3 shows women aged between 46-60 and column 4 shows the summary statistics of men
aged between 19-45.
11Table 1
Variable Treatment Alternative Treatment Control Alternative Control
Age 32.28 (0.007) 28.16 (0.013) 51.96 (0.006) 31.80 (0.007)
College Graduate 0.44 (0.001) 0.42 (0.001) 0.35 (0.001) 0.46 (0.0004)
High School Drop Out 0.17 (0.0003) 0.18 (0.0009) 0.26 (0.0006) 0.17 (0.0003)
Employed 0.74 (0.0004) 0.58 (0.001) 0.66 (0.0006) 0.91 (0.0003)
Fraction in States with no Law 0.56 (0.0006) 0.57 (0.0017) 0.55 (0.0009) 0.56 (0.0006)
Observations 1,210,503 164,265 618,343 1,269,131
Notes: Treatment refers to the women aged 19 to 45 with children older than one year old, or childless women;
Alternative Treatment refers to women aged 19 to 45 with children under the age of one. Control refers to women aged
46 to 60 and Alternative Control refers to men aged 19 to 45. Data are from IPUMS-CPS for the years 1979-2007.
There are some di⁄erences to be noted from the above summary statistics. Women with chil-
dren above the age of one or without children (column 1) have, on average, the same age as men (32
years), whereas women in alternative treatment group are on average younger than men (column
4). The percentage of employed in the treatment group is lower (74 versus 91 percent) than the
alternative control group, and the percentage employed for the alternative treatment group is even
lesser. Both treatment and alternative treatment group women on average are more educated than
women aged between 46-60 (control group). Notice that, the percentage of women and men in the
eighteen states which had no law prior to FMLA is fairly constant, so we can be certain that any
of the results are not driven by compositional changes. Since there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences
in educational attainments, the summary statistics indicate that any di⁄erences in the labor force
participation among the groups are not likely to be driven by di⁄erences in the demographic char-
acteristics of those groups. The only di⁄erence between the treatment (and alternative treatment)
and control (and alternative control) groups are that the former have been a⁄ected by changes in
parental leave laws whereas the latter have not been a⁄ected by such changes.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the case of California (2001-2007). Column 1 shows
the treatment group, column 2 the alternative treatment group, while columns 3 and 4 show the
control and the alternative control group, respectively.
12Table 2
Variable Treatment Alternative treatment Control Alt. Control
Age 32.95 (0.053) 30.45 (0.111) 51.49 (0.043) 32.51 (0.051)
College Graduate 0.56 (0.003) 0.53 (0.009) 0.57 (0.004) 0.51 (0.003)
High School Drop Out 0.18 (0.003) 0.22 (0.008) 0.19 (0.004) 0.20 (0.003)
Employed 0.73 (0.003) 0.55 (0.009) 0.71 (0.004) 0.89 (0.002)
Fraction in States with no Law 0.61 (0.001) 0.65 (0.002) 0.61 (.002) 0.61 (0.001)
Observations 21,733 2,880 112,45 23,236
Notes: Treatment refers to the women aged 19 to 45 with children older than one year old, or childless women;
Alternative Treatment refers to women aged 19 to 45 with children under the age of one. Control refers to women aged
46 to 60 and Alternative Control refers to men aged 19 to 45. Data are from IPUMS-CPS for the years 2001-2007.
Some di⁄erences can also be pointed out from the above table. Women with children above
the age of one or without children (column 1) have, on average, the same age as men (33 years),
whereas women in alternative treatment group are younger (30 years); treatment group works less
than the alternative control group (73 versus 89 percent), whereas alternative treatment group are
less likely to be employed compared to both control groups. Both the treatment and alternative
treatment group women are similarly educated compared to women and men in the control groups.
5 Empirical results for female employment
The likely direction of the e⁄ects of maternity leave policies on female employment is not clear
apriori. On the one hand, if women are more inclined to take leave and return to their previous
jobs, then we expect to ￿nd a positive e⁄ect on employment. On the other hand, if employers pass
on the costs of mandated bene￿ts to those potentially bene￿tting from it (women of childbearing
age), then we might observe a decrease in employment. Further, if these two e⁄ects o⁄set each
other, we might ￿nd no impact on employment at all. Therefore, the direction of the e⁄ect of
maternity leave policies on female employment is an empirical question. This section, given the
13above research design, estimates the following equation
Yilt = ￿0+￿1t + ￿2NSl+￿3TGi+￿4NSl￿TGi+￿0POSTt+￿1NSl￿POSTt
+￿2TGi￿POSTt+￿3NSl￿TGi￿POSTt (1)
where i indexes the individual, l the state and t the year. The outcome variable of interest, Yilt; is
a dummy equal to one if a woman worked for at least one week during the previous year, and zero
otherwise. NSl is a dummy equal to one if the lth state has no state parental leave policy before
1993, and zero if the state had TDI. TGi is a dummy taking a value one if individual i belongs
to the treatment group and zero otherwise. Finally, POSTt is a year dummy taking value one
after FMLA was enacted (i.e. after 1993) and zero otherwise. Since FMLA was enacted in 1993,
we conduct our analysis pre and post 1993, in order to capture the impact of the law on female
employment. We de￿ne employment as working for a positive number of weeks during the year. In
alternate speci￿cations, we use labor force participation rate as the outcome variable, where it is
de￿ned as participation in the labor force during the preceding week. The parameter of interest is
￿3, which reports the DDD estimates. Intuitively, ￿3 measures how female employment in treated
states, treated gropus and the relevant years di⁄er from the employment in the non-treated groups.
5.1 Analysis of FMLA in states with and without TDI
Table 5a in the appendix reports the di⁄erential impact of FMLA on female employment between
states that had no law prior to FMLA and states which had TDI before FMLA. Column (3) shows
the di⁄erence between the change in female employment for experimental states ￿ those with no
previous laws￿and non-experimental states ￿ those with TDI, before and after 1993. Column (4)
represents the change of female employment between the treatment and control group, i.e. DDD.
Finally, DDD adjusted 1 controls for marital status ￿ i.e. dummy variable married takes a value
of one if the individual is married and zero otherwise￿ , DDD adjusted 2 includes a time trend
since the data contains more pre than post years, and DDD adjusted 3 controls for both marital
status and time trend. Notice that the Treatment group represents women aged 19-45 with their
youngest child above age one or childless women, while control group are women aged 46-60 years
and alternative control group are men aged 19-45 years.
14In order to analyze the possibility of a di⁄erent impact of FMLA depending on the woman￿ s
educational attainment, we di⁄erentiate our sample by education levels. In particular, the dummy
variable Educi is one when individual i has less than 12 years of schooling, and zero otherwise.
We divide our sample into two groups, one represents high school dropouts and the second group
contains the individuals who have a high school degree, a college degree or are college dropouts. In
this case, equation 1 can be rewritten as,
Yilt = ￿0+￿1tl + ￿2NSl+￿3TGi+￿4NSl￿TGi+￿0POSTt+￿1NSl￿POSTt+￿2TGi￿POSTt
+￿3NSl￿TGi￿POSTt + ￿5Educ + ￿6NSl￿Educi+￿7TGi￿Educi+￿8NSl￿TGi￿Educi
+￿4POSTt￿Educi+￿5NSl￿POSTt￿Educi+￿6TGi￿POSTt￿Educi
+￿7NSl￿TGi￿POSTt￿Educi (2)
The results obtained from both equations (with and without the dummy variable Educ) are shown
in tables 5a and 5b in the appendix. In addition, the same analysis is conducted for labor force
participation, where Yilt is a dummy equal to one if a woman participated in the labor force during
the preceding week and zero otherwise (tables 6a and 6b contain the results obtained for labor force
participation).
According to the PDA in 1978, the TDI should treat every pregnancy as a temporary disability.
Hence the coverage of the TDI extended to cover pregnancy as mandatory after the passage of the
PDA. In order to analyze the possibility of a di⁄erential impact of FMLA on female employment
and labor force participation rates, we restrict the sample for the pre-FMLA period from 1978
through 1992.
5.1.1 Analysis of the results
Table 5a suggests that when the treatment group is compared to the control group as observed in
column 4, the introduction of FMLA has an e⁄ect on female employment which is indistinguishable
from zero. However, when the treatment group is compared to the alternative control group, i.e.
men, the DDD estimates are positive and signi￿cant. This result suggests that female employment
increased in states which had no law compared to the TDI states after the implementation of
15FMLA, when women in their childbearing ages are compared to men. When we further analyze
by the educational attainment, table 5b shows signi￿cant DDD estimates for high-school dropout
women, when the employment of female are compared to men.
We further check whether the high educated women (having more than a high school degree) are
di⁄erentially a⁄ected by the implementation of FMLA. The results indicate (tables not reported)
that there is no impact of FMLA on the employment of higher educated women in states with no law
compared to the TDI states, when women in childbearing ages are compared to men. In addition,
the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero when these women are compared to the
control group, i.e. older women.
On the one hand, the positive and signi￿cant results can be explained using the theoretical
predictions of mandated leave policies described in section 3 (Ruhm, 1997). In particular, this
literature suggests that, after the introduction of maternity leave policies, labor demand shifts
downwards, decreasing employment level. However, as women￿ s awareness of the policy increases,
we should expect a downward shift in the labor supply curve, raising employment level as a con-
sequence. Nonetheless, in the long run, women are more likely to return to their original jobs
(reducing the employer adjustment costs) and work more hours to be eligible for the bene￿ts. The
former e⁄ects may increase the employer￿ s labor demand ￿ due to the higher productivity levels of
female employees￿ shifting it upwards, what is referred by the literature as the dynamic e⁄ect of
mandated leave policies. In this context, our results re￿ ect that the dynamic e⁄ect of FMLA is
slightly positive and signi￿cant for women in their childbearing ages (when compared to men).
On the ther hand, the above insigni￿cant results could be rationalized by the fact that the
paper considers a long period of time and hence on average the e⁄ects are obscured, although there
might be a di⁄erent impact for some of the years compared to others. In order to overcome this
problem we repeat the analysis by separately taking each of the years after 1993, however, this new
approach did not change the results.
Regarding our results related to labor force participation, table 6a shows that the DDD es-
timates are positive and signi￿cant when we compare treatment group to the alternative control
group. Hence, the change in female labor force participation after the FMLA was enacted (between
16experimental and non-experimental states) is signi￿cantly higher for those women potentially ben-
e￿ting from the law (in the treatment group) than for men (in the alternative group). Therefore,
the change in female labor force participation after the FMLA was higher for women in states with
no maternity leave laws prior to FMLA compared to women in states with TDI
Table 6b analyzes the possibility of a di⁄erent impact of FMLA, depending on the woman￿ s
educational attainment. Indeed, we also observe a positive and signi￿cant DDD estimates for
high-school dropout women, when the employment of female are compared to men. There is a
positive e⁄ect on the female labor force participation when we analyze by the high educated group
of women. Hence, the aforementioned shift in female labor supply can be mainly explained by a
change in willingness to work for low-educated women, and also a change in incentives for higher
educated women.
Table 13 analyzes the results from a falsi￿cation exercise pretending that FMLA was adopted
in 1981 instead of the actual year 1993 of its implementation. Hence pretending that treatment
occurred several years before it actually did, we ￿nd that none of the estimates are statistically
signi￿cant. As reported in table 13, the DDD estimates are positive but insigni￿cant when we
compare the treatment group both to the control group (older women) and to the alternative control
group (men). Therefore, the change in female labor force participation after the implementation of
the FMLA (pretending it was adopted in 1981) was not statistically di⁄erent for women in states
which had no maternity leave laws prior to FMLA compared to women in states with TDI
5.2 Analysis of extensions of FMLA
Using equation (1) we study the e⁄ects of the expansions of FMLA that the aforementioned four
states introduces in their jurisdiction. The results obtained for each state are presented in tables 7
through 10 in the appendix. Speci￿cally, in this section we report the estimates of the alternative
treatment group, which is composed of women aged 19 to 45 with children under the age of one,
comparing it with both the control and the alternative control group. We do not discuss our ￿ndings
for the treatment group since they are insigni￿cant and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The DDD estimates are positive and statistically signi￿cant for Oregon (table 9a in the appen-
17dix). In particular, the labor force participation rates for the alternative treatment group are higher
by 18.84 and 11.04 percentage points in Oregon compared to states which did not expand FMLA,
when we consider the control and alternative control group respectively. This result indicates that
making the FMLA more generous in terms of eligibility and leave options encourages more women
in the childbearing age with young infants to participate in the labor force, compared to similar
women in states which o⁄er no such generosity. The results are very similar if we control for marital
status and include a linear time trend. However, when we further divide the sample into two groups
based on their educational attainment, the di⁄erence in the employment growth of women with
infants between Oregon and states that had no law before FMLA is not signi￿cant12.
The women in the childbearing age with young infants are also 17.15 percentage points more
likely to be employed in Oregon compared to similar women in states which do not complement
the FMLA (table 9b in appendix) and 10.01 percentage points more likely to be employed when
compared to men. Similar to the result for labor force participation, exploring the possibility of a
di⁄erential impact depending on the educational attainment, we do not ￿nd any value statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Note that Oregon is the state o⁄ering the most generous bene￿ts
and eligibility criteria in its expansion of FMLA. In particular, this state reduced the minimum
number of ￿rm employees from 50 to 25, and the number of days worked for the same ￿rm to 180.
Intuitively, the positive e⁄ect of such generous expansion may come from two sources. First, women
may increase their willingness to work, which shifts the female labor supply downwards. Second, a
generous FMLA expansion raises the opportunity cost from losing the job, which increases worker￿ s
e⁄ort and productivity, ultimately leading to a greater employer￿ s demand for female workers.
The DDD estimates are positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 5-percent level for female
labor force participation rates, for Maine (table 8 in the appendix). The female labor force par-
ticipation rates are higher by 14.57 percentage points in Maine compared to states which did not
expand FMLA, when we consider the alternative control group. The labor force participation rates
for women with young children in Maine are higher by 13.38 percentage points when compared with
men in the same age group. The results are very similar if we control for the marital status of the
individual and include a linear time trend. However, the estimates are not statistically signi￿cant
12The DDD estimates for the two diferent educational groups are not reported.
18for female employment, and when we divide the sample into groups based on their educational
attainment.
One of the reasons of not observing any signi￿cant impact on female employment and female
labor force participation in the other two studied states might be that the expansions are not
e⁄ective enough to invoke any change in the employment behavior of women in these states. With
a more relaxed eligibility criteria and greater complementarity to the FMLA, the states might be
able to initiate an increase in female labor force participation rate as well as in female employment.
Finally, the state of Vermont has the smallest sample size of all groups in this analysis, hence it is
not surprising that none of the results are signi￿cant for this state.
5.3 Analysis of California￿ s Paid Family Leave program
In this subsection, we use equation (1) to examine how California￿ s Paid Family Leave program
has a⁄ected the change in female employment and labor force participation rates. We compare
California￿ s Paid Family Leave program with those states applying the expanded and non-expanded
FMLA. Table 11a in the appendix analyzes how the female labor force participation changed in
California before and after the enactment of the Paid Family Leave program in 2004. In particular,
Column 3 (DD estimates) in table 11a in the appendix compares the change in the female labor
force participation with respect to that in states which only had FMLA (non-expanded), and the
four states which have expanded FMLA programs. Finally, Column 4 (DDD estimates) compares
the change in female labor force participation between the treatment and control groups. The
results for the change in female employment are given in tables 12a and 12b in the appendix.
We observe that the DDD estimates are both economically and statistically insigni￿cant. Hence
the introduction of the Paid Family Leave program did not initiate an increase in female labor
force participation, when comparng it to the labor force participation of women in states which
had no law before FMLA as well as states which expanded FMLA. Similar results are obtained
for female employment. The ￿ndings are also the same when considering women with young
infants (alternative treatment group) as our treatment group. When we further carry out the
analysis dividing the women in the sample into two di⁄erent educational groups, the results are
19still statistically insigni￿cant13. Following section 3, in the context of changes in supply and demand
curves, these results would suggest that the decrease in labor demand o⁄sets the increase in female
labor supply in the three-year period following the implementation of the law, and future years
of data are needed to observe whether the dynamic e⁄ect on labor demand ￿nally raises female
employment. Whenever a new policy is implemented at the state level, people are not immediately
aware of its bene￿ts and hence a certain period of time and learning are required before we can
observe the full e⁄ects of such a policy. It should also be noted that California is a state where
women having children can utilize the bene￿ts of TDI and FMLA. Hence it might not be possible for
Paid Family Leave program to initiate any further changes to the employment behavior of women,
especially when such leave policy is fully funded by the employees themselves. A relevant policy
recommendation would be to implement such a policy where there could be equal contributions on
part of the employer in addition to that of an employee.
Another possible explanation for the insigni￿cant results of the Paid Family Leave program in
California could be the low take-up rates. According to the statistics reported by the Employment
Development Department of California, the percentage claim of PFL bene￿ts was only 1.01% in
2005 and 1.07% in 2006. A study by Rothschild (2007) suggests the possible reasons for the low
take-up rates14. The most important of them is that a signi￿cant portion of California￿ s workforce
is undocumented, due to the high percentage of immigrant population in this speci￿c state. Also,
workers use available sick leave, vacation leave instead of parental leave and hence no claims are
￿led. The surveys conducted support the lack of worker awareness of the available bene￿ts provided
by the Paid Family Leave program, which further adds to the ine⁄ectiveness of such parental leave
policies.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the e⁄ect of federal and state parental leave policies on female employment
and labor force participation, analyzing the interaction of these laws when more than one coexists
in the same labor market. First, we shows that the introduction of the Family and Medical Leave
13The results for the di⁄erent educational groups are not reported.
14Jesse Rothschild and Rothschild-Landry Holding Inc.(November 2007). This study predicts the take-up rates for
Washington￿ s recent Paid Family Leave law based on the ￿ndings for California￿ s Paid Family Leave program.
20Act (FMLA) has a signi￿cantly positive impact on the employment of women in those states with
no law providing parental leave bene￿ts than in those applying the Temporary Disability Insurance
(TDI). However, the estimated e⁄ects are quite small. Since the FMLA is granting unpaid leave,
one implication of this result is that the FMLA is not really a⁄ecting the employment decisions
of women in childbearing ages since most of them cannot a⁄ord to take leave which provides no
payment. In general, the results suggest that the bene￿ts associated with the FMLA are not enough
to alter the labor force participation decisions of women who are the potential bene￿ciaries of the
law by a substantial amount.
Second, we ￿nd that the impact of FMLA expansion on female employment and labor force
participation in those states with the most generous expansions (in terms of improving the bene￿ts
and relaxing the eligibility criteria of FMLA) is signi￿cantly higher than in those states which
did not expand FMLA. In particular, the higher opportunity cost from losing the job and its
consequences on productivity may explain these interesting results.
Finally, in order to get an intuitive understanding of the e⁄ects of further increases in the gen-
erosity levels of parental leave policies, we consider the recent enactment of California￿ s Paid Family
Leave program. Speci￿cally, we obtain that there is no impact of the introduction of this law, which
may be due to the short time period of its application. Additionally, another explanation for the
limitation of this policy (neither positive nor negative e⁄ect) on female employment and labor force
participation is based on the previous adjustments in California￿ s female labor market prior to the
passage of this leave program. The previous implemented policies reduce the possibility of further
changes in the labor market behavior of both female workers and their employers. Furthermore,
the low take-up rates of the policy plays a crucial role in explaining its lack of e⁄ectiveness.
More extensive analysis should be conducted specially in the case of California, in order to test
the hypothesis. Further research can be carried out to examine the impact of additional increases
in the generosity levels of federal and state parental leave policies on female employment and labor
force participation, as well as the interaction of these policies in the same labor market, as is
suggested in this paper.
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237 Appendix
Table 3: Weekly Bene￿t amount and Duration of Bene￿ts in TDI states
State Status Weekly Benefit Amount Duration
CA All
workers
$50-$336 based on schedule of high
quarter wage
6 –  52 weeks, $300- $14,472, computed as
lesser of 52 x weekly benefit amount or the
total of base period wages.
Duration separate from UI
HI Employed
workers
$14-$357.  For  an  average  weekly
wage of less than $26, weekly benefit
amount is the average weekly wage
up to a maximum of $14 . If average
weekly wage is $26 or more, weekly
b e n e f i t  a m o u n t  i s  5 8 % of  average
weekly wage with a maximum of 66 -
2/3 percent of average weekly wage.
Uniform 26 weeks in benefit year
Unemploy
ed worker
Same as UI Balance of weeks claimant would have been
eligible for benefits in his UI benefit year
but not more than 26 weeks.
NJ Employed
workers
$68-$470  (based  on  schedule  of
average  weekly  wage).  Average
weekly wage determined by dividing
wage  from  1  employer  during  base
weeks in weeks. If less than average
using  all  employment  during  last  8
weeks,  use  earnings  from  all
employers.
Computed as lesser of 26 x weekly benefit
amount  or  1/3  base  period  wages.  Limit
applies  to  benefits  in  any  12  consecutive
mo nt h  p e rio d s . D u rat io n s e p a r ate  f ro m  U I




$61-$475  (ba sed  on  schedule  of
average  weekly  wage).  Average
weekly wage determined by dividing
wage  from  1  employer  in  all  base
weeks by numbers of base weeks. If
n o t  2 0  b a s e  w e e k s  w i t h  a n y  1
employer,  average  base  weeks  with
all employers.
15-26 weeks, $1,095-$9,464 computed as ¾
weeks,  but  not  more  than  26  x  weekly
benefit  amount.  Duration  under  UI  and
disability  during  employment  limited  to




$20 - $170 on basis of one -half average
weekly wage in last 8 weeks, or portion
thereof, in coveredemployment prior to
commencement of disability.
If  average  is  less  than  $20,  weekly
benefit is average wage.
Uniform  potential  26  weeks  in  any  52
consecutive  weeks  or  for  any  single  period  of
disability, $520 (or less if weekly benefit amount




$53 - $588 (4.62% of high quarter wages
up  to  85%  of  state’ s  average  weekly
wage in preceding calendar year, plus the
greater of $10 or 7% of the individual’ s
benefit rate  for  each dependent  up to 5
dependents).
12 - 30 weeks $636- $17,640 computed as 36%
of  total  base  period  wages  plus  dependent
allowance if any.
Source: Institute for Women￿ s Policy Research, May 1993




















































































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Employment Standards Administration.
25Table 5a: The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states with TDI before FMLA.
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.adj1 DDD.adj2 DDD adj3
Treat Pre￿ 93 0.790 0.740
Pos￿ 93 0.720 0.660 0.016
Control Pre￿ 93 0.630 0.630
Obs.675,816 Pos￿ 93 0.740 0.720 0.020 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
standard errors (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Alt. Control Pre￿ 93 0.920 0.900
Obs.963,726 Pos￿ 93 0.920 0.890 0.012 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
standard errors (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
marital status? no yes no yes
linear time trend? no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre ￿ 93 period consists of the years 1978 - 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported. * denotes
signi￿cance at one-percent level.
Table 5b The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states with TDI before FMLA, by
education groups
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD adj1 DDD adj2 DDD adj3
Treat Pre￿ 93 0.910 0.860
Pos￿ 93 0.880 0.810 0.017
Control Pre￿ 93 0.770 0.780
Obs.675,816 Pos￿ 93 0.840 0.810 0.031 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015
F-statistic (3.76) (4.92) (3.96) (5.12)
Alt. Control Pre￿ 93 0.810 0.800
Obs.963,726 Pos￿ 93 0.790 0.780 0.001 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.007***
F-statistic (12.11) (12.66) (12.08) (12.65)
marital status? no yes no yes
linear time trend? no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre ￿ 93 period consists of the years 1978- 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported. * denotes
signi￿cance at one-percent level.
26Table 6a The estimates of FLFP rates between states with no law and states with TDI before FMLA.
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.adj1 DDD.adj2 DDD adj3
Treat Pre￿ 93 0.745 0.706
Pos￿ 93 0.686 0.623 0.024
Control Pre￿ 93 0.581 0.595
Obs.675,816 Pos￿ 93 0.712 0.699 0.026 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
standard errors (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Alt. Control Pre￿ 93 0.919 0.907
Obs.963,726 Pos￿ 93 0.908 0.886 0.010 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
standard errors (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
marital status? no yes no yes
linear time trend? no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre ￿ 93 period consists of the years 1978 through 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj
1 reports estimates controlling for marital status, DDDadj2 reports estimates controlling for a linear time trend and
DDDadj3 reports estimates controlling for both. * denotes signi￿cance at one-percent level.
27Table 6b The estimates of FLFP rates between states with no law and states with TDI before FMLA, by education
groups
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD adj1 DDD adj2 DDD adj3
Treat Pre￿ 93 0.860 0.808
Pos￿ 93 0.836 0.763 0.021
Control Pre￿ 93 0.732 0.753
Obs.675,816 Pos￿ 93 0.821 0.807 0.035 -0.014 -0.017 -0.015 -0.042
F-statistic (4.22) (5.64) (4.63) (4.22)
Alt. Control Pre￿ 93 0.774 0.769
Obs.963,726 Pos￿ 93 0.746 0.740 0.001 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021***
F-statistic (17.92) (19.09) (18.09) (17.92)
marital status? no yes no yes
linear time trend? no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre ￿ 93 period consists of the years 1978 through 1992. Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj
1 reports estimates controlling for marital status, DDDadj2 reports estimates controlling for a linear time trend and
DDDadj3 reports estimates controlling for both. * denotes signi￿cance at one-percent level.
28Table 7: The estimates of Female Labor Force Participation rates between Connecticut and states with no law
before FMLA
Connecticut Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 1997 0.582 0.595
Pos 1997 0.684 0.588 0.109
Control Pre 1997 0.700 0.685
Obs. 27,884 Pos 1997 0.758 0.703 0.039 0.069 0.068
standard errors (0.079) (0.0797)
Alt. Control Pre 1997 0.885 0.912
Obs. 56,190 Pos 1997 0.883 0.913 -0.002 0.111 0.112
standard errors (0.074) (0.073)
Control for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_97
years are ￿ 94-￿ 96. Post_97 years are ￿ 97-￿ 99.
Table 8: The estimates of Female Labor Force Participation rates between Maine and states with no law before
FMLA.
Maine Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 1997 0.619 0.595
Pos 1997 0.748 0.588 0.136
Control Pre 1997 0.716 0.684
Obs. 27,886 Pos 1997 0.724 0.703 -0.009 0.146** 0.142**
standard errors (0.079) (0.079)
Alt. Control Pre 1997 0.897 0.912
Obs. 56,213 Pos 1997 0.901 0.913 0.002 0.134** 0.137**
standard errors (0.073) (0.074)
Control for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. ** Statistically signi￿cant at the 5-percent level. DDDadj 1 reports
estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_97 years are ￿ 94-￿ 96. Post_97 years are ￿ 97-￿ 99.
29Table 9a: The estimates of FLFP rates between Oregon and states with no law before FMLA.
Oregon Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 1996 0.417 0.592
Pos 1996 0.527 0.570 0.131
Control Pre 1996 0.747 0.668
Obs. 28,463 Pos 1996 0.720 0.699 -0.057 0.188*** 0.188***
standard errors (0.075) (0.075)
Alt. Control Pre 1996 0.909 0.913
Obs. 58,817 Pos 1996 0.929 0.913 0.021 0.110* 0.105*
standard errors (0.069) (0.069)
Control for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. *** Statistically signi￿cant at the 10-percent level. DDDadj 1
reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_96 years are ￿ 93-￿ 95. Post_96 years are ￿ 96-￿ 98.
Table 9b: The estimates of Female Employment between Oregon and states with no law before
FMLA.Female Employment.
Oregon Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 1996 0.554 0.661
Pos 1996 0.686 0.661 0.131
Control Pre 1996 0.785 0.706
Obs. 28,463 Pos 1996 0.768 0.729 -0.040 0.172*** 0.171***
standard errors (0.069) (0.069)
Alt. Control Pre 1996 0.916 0.931
Obs. 58,817 Pos 1996 0.949 0.932 0.031 0.100* 0.100*
standard errors (0.063) (0.063)
Control for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. * Statistically signi￿cant at the 1-percent level. *** Statistically
signi￿cant at the 10-percent level. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_96 years are
￿ 93-￿ 95. Post_96 years are ￿ 96-￿ 98.
30Table 10: The estimates of FLFP rates between Vermont and states with no law before FMLA.
Vermont Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Alt. Treat Pre 1998 0.575 0.599
Pos 1998 0.666 0.587 0.104
Control Pre 1998 0.750 0.692
Obs. 27,672 Pos 1998 0.771 0.708 0.005 0.099 0.099
standard errors (0.081) (0.076)
Alt. Control Pre 1998 0.899 0.912
Obs.54,698 Pos 1998 0.915 0.915 0.013 0.091 0.088
standard errors (0.076) (0.076)
Controls for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_98
years are ￿ 95-￿ 97. Post_98 years are ￿ 98-￿ 00.
Table 11a The estimates of FLFP rates between California and states with no law before FMLA.
California Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Treat Pre 2004 0.761 0.778
Pos 2004 0.736 0.756 -0.002
Control Pre 2004 0.718 0.718
Obs. 143,023 Pos 2004 0.721 0.719 0.001 -0.007 -0.006
standard errors (0.013) (0.013)
Alt. Control Pre 2004 0.899 0.908
Obs.193,978 Pos 2004 0.888 0.899 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005
standard errors (0.008) (0.083)
Controls for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_04
years are ￿ 01-￿ 03. Post_04 years are ￿ 04-￿ 07.
31Table 11b The estimates of FLFP rates between California and states with which expanded FMLA.
California Exp. FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Treat Pre 2004 0.816 0.795
Pos 2004 0.790 0.769 -0.001
Control Pre 2004 0.682 0.773
Obs. 54,838 Pos 2004 0.685 0.776 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
standard errors (0.016) (0.016)
Alt. Control Pre 2004 0.899 0.900
Obs. 74,235 Pos 2004 0.888 0.885 0.004 -0.007 -0.008
standard errors (0.115) (0.115)
Controls for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_04
years are ￿ 01-￿ 03. Post_04 years are ￿ 04-￿ 07.
Table 12a The estimates of Female Employment between California and states with no law before FMLA.
California Only FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Treat Pre 2004 0.787 0.807
Pos 2004 0.764 0.783 0.001
Control Pre 2004 0.745 0.745
Obs. 143,023 Pos 2004 0.744 0.739 0.005 -0.005 -0.004
standard errors (0.124) (0.012)
Alt. Control Pre 2004 0.921 0.921
Obs. 193,978 Pos 2004 0.903 0.905 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
standard errors (0.008) (0.008)
Controls for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_04
years are ￿ 01-￿ 03. Post_04 years are ￿ 04-￿ 07.
32Table 12b The estimates of Female Employment between California and states which expanded FMLA.
California Exp. FMLA DD DDD DDD adj. 1
Treat Pre 2004 0.843 0.831
Pos 2004 0.819 0.814 -0.006
Control Pre 2004 0.704 0.801
Obs. 54,838 Pos 2004 0.702 0.795 0.004 -0.013 -0.012
standard errors (0.016) (0.016)
Alt. Control Pre 2004 0.904 0.927
Obs. 74,235 Pos 2004 0.886 0.910 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
standard errors (0.011) (0.011)
Controls for marital status? no yes
Includes linear time trend? no no
Notes: Robust Standard errors are reported. DDDadj 1 reports estimates controlling for marital status. Pre_04
years are ￿ 01-￿ 03. Post_04 years are ￿ 04-￿ 07.
33Table 13: Falsi￿cation: The estimates of Female Employment between states with no law and states with TDI
before FMLA.assuming FMLA adopted in 1981
NoLaw(1) TDI(2) DD(3) DDD(4) DDD.adj1 DDD.adj2 DDD adj3
Treat Pre￿ 81 0.686 0.680
Pos￿ 81 0.684 0.674 0.005
Control Pre￿ 81 0.539 0.543
Obs.675,816 Pos￿ 81 0.552 0.568 -0.011 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.017
standard errors (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Alt. Control Pre￿ 81 0.924 0.912
Obs.963,726 Pos￿ 81 0.919 0.908 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
standard errors (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
marital status? no yes no yes
linear time trend? no no yes yes
Notes: The Pre ￿ 81 period consists of the years 1978 - 1980. Robust Standard errors are reported.
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